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RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING--PREFERRED CLAIMS-EFFECT OF GIVING NOTICE
UNDER SIxTY-DAY-NOTICE RuLE-Plaintiff sought to withdraw her savings
account. On being refused payment because of a rule requiring sixty days'
notice before withdrawal, she immediately gave notice. Before sixty days had
elapsed, the bank became insolvent. Plaintiff claimed preference over the gen-
eral depositors. Held, that the plaintiff has a preferred claim. Mallet v. Tunni-
cliffe, 136 So. 346 (Fla. 1931).'
A depositor is generally given a preference in the assets of an insolvent bank
where his money was held in special deposit 2 or where his deposit had been in-
duced by deceitful representations of the bank's solvency, providing that it can
be traced. 3 Likewise; a beneficiary has a preferred claim where the bank has
received trust funds knowing that they were wrongfully deposited. 4  The instant
case extends such preference to situations where the depositor has made his
demand for payment but the money has been withheld because of a sixty-day-
notice rule. The court does not assume, however, to establish any new class of
preference, but brings this case within the category of special deposits by adopt-
ing the fiction that receipt by a bank of a withdrawal check operates to segregate
such sum from its general funds. While there are analagous cases holding to
this effect, where a check is accepted for application to a specific purpose, they
are generally looked upon with disfavor.6 Nor can it be successfully maintained
that the original debtor-creditor relationship between bank and depositor ter-
minated upon plaintiff's demand for her money, since the refusal of a debtor
'Rehearing denied and another. opinion given. U. S. Daily, Nov. 4, 1931, at 2o12.
"A special deposit is where the whole contract is that the thing deposited shall be safely
kept and that identical thing returned to the depositor." I MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th
ed. 1928) § 183. Upon failure of the bank, the depositor is entitled to receive the amount of
his special deposit in priority over other creditors of the bank. Titlow v. Sundqist, 234
Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 9th, i916) ; In re Central Bank and Trust Co. v. Ritchie, 12o Wash. i6o,
206 Pac. 926 (1922) ; Star Cutter Co. v. Smith, 37 Ill. App. 212 (189o). ". . . the special
depositor may reclaim his entire deposit if it is found intact, or, under the modem modifica-
tion of the rule, may reclaim it from the general mass with which it has been commingled if
it appears that the banker has not subsequent to the time of intermingling reduced the mass
to an amount less than the amount of the special deposit." Fullerton, J., in Northwest Lum-
ber Co. v. Scandinavian American Bank, 13o Wash. 33, at 37, 225 Pac. 825, at 826 (1924).
'Winifred Steele v. Commissioner of Banks, 240 Mass. 394, 134 N. E. 401 (1922); St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Millspaugh, 222 Mo. App. 110, 278 S. W. 786 (1926) ; Board of
Supervisors of Lunenburg County v. Prince Edward-Lunenburg County Bank, 138 Va. 333,
121 S. E. 9o3 (1924).
The instant case held that a depositor is not entitled to priority where he refrained froni
withdrawing his savings through fraud of the bank. This is in accord with the weight of
authority. Venner v. Cox, 35 S. W. 769 (Tenn. 1895) ; State v. Banking Corp. of Montana,
77 Mont. 134, 152, 251 Pac. 151, 154 (1926), "It would be a strange doctrine that would per-
mit a creditor to impress his debtor's property with a trust simply because when the creditor
attempted to collect the debt, the debtor falsely represented his ability to pay and thereby
obtained forebearance." See I MICHI, BANKS AND BANKING (1913) 594, n. 21.
' National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54 (1881) ; Paul v. Draper, 73 Mo. App. 566
(1898); 2 MICHIF, BANKS AND BANKING (1913) 943.
'Northwest Lumber Co. v. Scandinavian American Bank, supra note 2; Bryan v. Coco-
nut Grove Bank & Trust Co., 132 So. 48i (Fla. i931); The People v. The City Bank of
Rochester, 96 N. Y. 32 (1884). Contra: Mechanics & Metals Bank v. Buchanan, 12 F. (2d)
891 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
I See Note (927) 75 U. OF PA. L. R-v. 69. Although it might be argued that receipt of
the check created an obligation to set aside such funds for a specific purpose, nevertheless it
was still merely an obligation; and unless actual segregation of funds occurred, a special de-
5osit was not established.
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to pay his obligation does not make the debtor a trustee.7  The holding of the
instant case in putting a premium upon an attempt to withdraw one's money,
defeats the very purpose of these notice rules, Which is to bolster up the credit
of banks and to minimize the effect of public hysteria during times of depression.
CONDITIONAL SALES-MORTGAGES--FIxTURFS--RIGHTS TO PROPERTY AT-
TACHED TO MoRTGAGED REALTY-A corporation bought equipment under condi-
tional sales agreements. An insolvency receiver was later appointed for the
corporation, whereupon the plaintiff filed a bill to foreclose a real estate mortgage
given by the corporation on its property. The conditional vendors then filed
petitions for the removal of the equipment. Held, that those vendors may re-
cover, who, by the removal of their property, will not cause "material injury to
the freehold". Bank of American Nat. Ass'n v. LaReine Hotel Corp. et al., 156
Ati. 28 (N. J. 1931).
A conditional vendor of property which is subsequently attached to realty
so that it becomes a part thereof, will not, according to common law, be per-
mitted to claim it to the detriment of a mortgagee of the realty.- To determine
whether the property has been so affixed, the court, in the principal case, aban-
doned the rule of fixtures of the common law 2 and applied a test set down in the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act3 by saying, "the test of such close incorporation
is that material injury to the freehold will result if the chattel is removed".4
Even though the property has not become such a part of the real estate it does
not necessarily follow that the conditional vendor can reclaim it. Thus a few
courts 5 hold that where a mortgage has been placed on the realty prior to the
attachment of the chattel, the mortgagee never being a party to the contract should
not be bound by it but should rather benefit from the addition in security. The
weight of authority, however, is to the contrary 6 on the ground that the mortgagee
never relied on this particular property in advancing the loan and hence his
security is not being impaired if the property is withdrawn." Applying this same
reasoning to the case of a subsequent mortgagee it follows that the conditional
7 How much more true is the quotation, supra note 3, when the debtor does not falsely
represent his inability to pay? The instant court held that fraudulent representations induc-
ing a depositor not to withdraw funds do not create a preference, and yet when due to a
cause which ostensibly is to benefit all the creditors by a limitation placed upon withdrawal,
a preference is created. This is scarcely consistent.
1McMillan v. Leanman, ioi App. Div. 436, 9I N. Y. Supp. 1055 (,915); Detroit Steel
Cooperage Co. v. Sistersville Brewing Co., 233 U. S. 712, 34 Sup. Ct 753 (1914).
2 See (931) 5 So. CAIFn. REV. 71 for a discussion of the common law rule of fixtures.
3 UNiFoR CoNnrroAL SALES Acr § 7.
'The court quoted at p. 33 from BOGERT, ComtmETaRIEs ON CONDITIONAL SALES, UNI-
FORm LAWs ANNOTATED, Vol. 2-A.
' Gaunt v. Allen Lane Co., 128 Me. 41, 145 Adt. 255 (1929) ; Warren Hunt v. Bay State
Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279 (1867); Fuller Warren Co. v. Harter, no Wis. 8o, 85 N. W. 698
"Warren v. Liddell, IO Ala. 232, 20 So. 8g (i895) ; Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Aaron
Cohen et al., I56 Md. 368, I44 Atl. 641 (I928). This has even been extended to cases where
the prior mortgages contained "after acquired" clauses. General Electric Co. v. The Transit
Equipment Co., 57 N. J. Eq. 46o, 42 Atl. 1oi (1898) ; In re Sunflower Refining Co., ig. Fed.
i8o (C. C. A. 8th, 1912).
7 In Cox v. New Bern Lighting & Fuel Co., isi N. C. 62, 65 S. E. 648 (igog). it was
held that even though the conditional vendor knows that the property will be attached to mort-
gaged land the mortgagee does not have a superior right to the property. The principal case,
at p. 33, however, infers that under these circumstances there has been a waiver of the right
to retain title.
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vendor is not permitted to claim his property.' There is, however, authority
to the contrary 9 and it has even been held 'o that although there was a recording
act an unrecorded conditional sale would still have precedence because a mort-
gagor cannot mortgage a fixture if he does not own it. The confusion as to
the conflicting rights between the conditional vendor and the mortgagee is
apparent and though the Uniform Conditional Sales Act requires recording "
of the conditional sales agreement in order that the reservation of title have
validity, it unfortunately refers only to the rights of purchasers of the realty.
The obvious solution is an amendment to this act as adopted by the Pennsyl-
vania legislature,' 2 which defines the rights of a mortgagee under these circum-
stances, whether he be prior or subsequent.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COmmERcE-STATE TAXATION OF
GoODS IN TRANsIT-Plaintiff, an interstate railroad, sought to enjoin the state
from collecting a tax levied upon its ties in a creosoting plant. These ties were
shipped from points outside the state to the plant where they were sorted,
seasoned, creosoted, and stored three to four months until needed at different
points along the railroad's line. Held, that the state could tax the ties. Missomri
Pac. R. R. V. Schnipper, 51 F. (2d) 749 (E. D. Ill. i931).
Direct taxation of goods carried in interstate commerce is a burden upon
this commerce I and as such is an interference with the power of Congress '
to regulate it, unless the tax is levied in the proper exercise of the police power.
A difficulty arises with reference to the taxation of articles of commerce which are
temporarily detained within the state, for they may be viewed either as still being
in transit or as having obtained a taxable sit'us. In the case of goods which
come to rest for final sale within the state, they become part of the general mass
of property and are, therefore, amenable to taxation 4 providing the rates are
'Triumph Electric Co. v. Patterson, 211 Fed. 244 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914); Southbridge
Savings Bank v. Exter Machine Works, 127 Mass. 542 (1879). But cf. Central Trust v.
Arctic Ice Machine Co., 77 Md. 202, 26 AtI. 493 (1893), where a contrary result was reached
because a subsequent mortgagee had notice of the conditional sale.
'Adams Machine Co. v. Interstate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 11g Ala. 97, 24 So. 857 (1898);
First Nat'l Bank of Evanston v. Bank of Waynesboro, 262 Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 8th, i919).
Falaenau v. Reliance Steel Foundry Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 325, 69 Atl. 1o98 (9o8).
'UNIFORm CoNDI IOAL SAIS Acr § 6.
=Amendment of May 12, 1927, P. L. 979, § 7. "As against a subsequent . . .mortgagee
* such reservation shall be void as to any goods so attached to the realty as to form a part
thereof, unless the conditional sale contract or a copy thereof shall be filed . . before . . .
such mortgage is given...
"As against . . . a prior mortgagee . who has not assented to the reservation of
property, in the goods, if any of the goods are so attached to the realty as not to be severable
without material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property in the goods so attached
shall be void, notwithstanding the filing of the contract or a copy thereof, unless such injury,
although material be such as can be completely repaired and the seller, before retaking such
goods, furnishes or tenders to . . .prior mortgagee . . .a good and sufficient bond condi-
tioned for the immediate making of such repairs."
'Galveston R. R. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 28 Sup. Ct. 638 (19o8) ; ef. Leloup v. Mo-
bile, 127 U. S. 640, 8 Sup. Ct 1380 (1888).2U. S. Coi'sT., Art. I, § 8.
3 Pittsburgh & Southern Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156 U. S. 590, 15 Sup. Ct. 459 (i895);
Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U. S. 494, 34 Sup. Ct. 377 (1914) ; 2 CooLLY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIoNs (8th ed. 1927) 1274.
'Pittsburgh & Southern Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577, i5 Sup. Ct 415 (1895.);
Susquehanna Coal Co. v. City of South Amboy, 228 U. S. 665, 33 Sup. Ct. 712 (1913);
2 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF U. S. (2d ed. 1929) 1073. But cf. Swift & Co.
v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276 (19o5), holding that although there was
a cessation in transit for the purpose of effecting a sale the articles of commerce were still
subject to interstate commerce regulation.
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not discriminatory." Merchandise sent from outside the state and stored at a
distributing center in the state, for subsequent shipment to points outside, is
regarded as having lost its interstate character.6 However, when goods are sent
from one point to another in a state and there stored temporarily, the intention to
ship them outside the state immediately 7 and not at some indefinite time in the
future," as in the principal case, exempts them from the state taxing power.
Furthermore, the continuity of the interstate journey is not broken by an inter-
ruption in the transit which is necessary for the promotion of safe 9 and prac-
ticable 10 transportation. With reference to goods, which in passing through a
state undergo a process, the apparent rule is, that if the operation is simple, the
goods are still in interstate commerce,'1 and if it is complicated they are regarded
as within the control of the state and therefore subject to its taxation.1 2  Thus in
the instant case the result might have been opposite had the ties been subjected
only to the simple treatment of creosoting and then immediately shipped outside
the state.
CONTRACTS-GAMING--INTENTION NOT TO DELIVER COMMODITIES OR
STocKs-Plaintiff, a broker, sought to recover on a promissory note given to
cover a balance owing by reason of the purchase and sale of cotton futures.
The lower court found that the parties intended I that the transactions should not
be consummated by actual delivery, but that the profits and losses should be
determined and settlement made on the basis of market fluctuations. Held, that
'Tiernan v. Rinker, 1o2 U. S. 123 (i880) ; Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504, 33 Sup. Ct
229,(913).6 American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 Sup. Ct. 365 (1904); Susque-
hanna Coal Co. v. City of South Amboy, .upra note 4; Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262
U. S. 506, 43 Sup. Ct. 643 (1922).
SIn Hughes Bros. v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 469, 476, 47 Sup. Ct. 170, x72 (1926), the
court held that the goods were in interstate commerce, "if the other facts show that the
journey has already begun in good faith and temporary interruption of the passage is rea-
sonable and in furtherance of the intended transportation."
'Diamond Match Co. v. Ontoragon, 188 U. S. 82, 23 Sup. Ct 266 (19o3).
'Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, 26o U. S. 366, 43 Sup. Ct 146 (1922).
"Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 259 (19o3) (sheep grazing while passing
through the state); cf. Western Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U. S. 346, 37 Sup. Ct.
623 (1917) (stopping to unload part of the freight); Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279
U. S. 95, 49 Sup. Ct. 292 (1929) (oil stored in tanks at a port).
"' McFadden v. Alabama Great Southern R. R., 241 Fed. 562 (C. C. A. 3d 1917) (com-
pression of cotton); Phila. & Reading R. R. v. Hancock, 253 U. S. 284, 40 Sup. Ct 512
(i9"2) (coal weighed, inspected, and billed); Note (1926) U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 39o. Contra:
General Oil Co. v. Crain, 2o9 U. S. 211,1 28 Sup. Ct. 475 (1908) (oil placed in small con-
tainers).
' Bacon v. Illinois, spra note 5 (grain weighed, cleaned, clipped, dried and sacked).
'The intent is a question for the jury or court on a consideration of all the circumstances
and not the words of the contract alone. Harwig v. Booth, 217 Ill. App. 70 (192o) ; Staf-
ford County Grain Co. v. Rock Milling Co., 94 Kan. 36o, 146 Pac. 1139 (1915). In the in-
stant case, the court found the intention not to deliver from the facts that neither party had
any facilities for handling the cotton, that the defendant was not financially able to accept the
cotton purchased, that he would not have been able to deliver the cotton sold if called for,
and that the dealings were entirely on margin. Accord: Allen v. Denman, 278 S. W. 899
(Tex. 1925) (jury finding reversed). In Hoit v. Zyskind, 155 Atl. 136 (N. J. 1931), a judg-
ment of nonsuit was reversed because the evidence showed that the securities purchased were
at all times available to the customer and deliverable upon payment of the purchase price. But
cf. Clark v. Merriam, 223 S. W. 869 (Tex. 192o).
In Coughlin v. Ferro, I P. (2d) Iio (Wash. 1931), great stress is laid upon the fact
that the dealings were solely on margin, yet in Kendall v. Fries, 71 N. J. L. 401, 58 Atl. lo9O
(19o4), the court held that margin and options are at most evidence of speculation and fall
far short of proving an intention to deal in differences.
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the plaintiff could not recover since the transactions constituted gambling in cot-
ton futures. Ware v. Burleson, 41 S. W. (2d) 338 (Tex. [93I ).
A transaction in commodities or stocks which is entered into without the
intention of making delivery, but only the payment of differences being contem-
plated, is a wagering contract and therefore void.' It is the intent which exists
at the time of entering into the contract which determines its validity,3 and in
most jurisdictions, the intent to gamble must be mutual in order to invalidate
the contract.4 If the transaction is deemed illegal, the broker cannot recover for
his services, unpaid balances,' or gains paid to customers; 7 nor can he foreclose
a mortgage 8 or enforce liens on other securities. 9 Although as a rule margin
deposited on illegal transactions cannot be recovered by the customer, 0 it is
sometimes permitted by statute."' Marginal contracts -are not illegal per se,
12
nor are options.18 Short sales are legal since the seller contemplates delivering
stocks which he or his broker will borrow.'4 Hedging contracts, whereby persons
who make actual contracts of purchase or sale of commodities in advance, insure
IHarvey v. Merrill, 15o Mass. i, 22 N. E. 49 (1899) ; Mohr v. Meisen, 47 Minn. 228,.49
N. W. 862 (i8gi) ; Waugh v. Beck, I14 Pa. 422, 6 Atl. 923 (1886).
3Lyons Milling Co. v. Goffe, 46 F. (2d) 241 (C. C. A. ioth, 1931). If the contract calls
for future delivery at its inception, it does not become unlawful because of a subsequent
change in the intention of the parties. Mullinix v. Hubbard, 6 F. (2d) Iog (C. C. A. 8th,
1925). Conversely, it would seem that an illegal contract cannot be validated by a subse-
quent actual purchase by the broker. Yet it has been held that if the broker makes bona fide
contracts with his jobber, under which there is liability to the jobber, the broker can sue the
customer for indemnity, although the latter intends to deal in differences to the knowledge
of the broker. Franklin & Co. v. Dawson, [1913] 29 T. L. R. 479; Houghton v. Keveney,
230 Mass. 49, 19 N. E. 447 (igi8).
'Browne v. Thorne, 26o U. S. 137, 43 Sup. Ct 36 (1922) ; Hoyt v. Wickham, 25 F. (2d)
777 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) ; Harwig v. Booth, supra note i. But in several states statutes have
made the intention of one party, even though not.disclosed to he other, sufficient to invalidate
the contract. Smith v. Bailey, 200 Mo. App. 627, 209 S. W. 945 (1919) ; Allen v. Dunham, 92
Tenn. 257, 21 S. W. 98 (1892).
Lamson v. West, 201 Ill. App. 251 (1917).
'Fraser v. Farmers Co-op Co., 167 Minn. 369, 2o9 N. W. 33 (1926); Snider v. Harvey,
215 Pa. 538, 64 At. 687 (I9O6).
Sawers Grain Co. v. Teagarden, 84 Ind. App. 522, 48 N. E. 205 (1925).
'Supra note 5. But he can recover for taxes paid by him as mortgagee of the property.
Hudson v. Moon, 42 Utah 377, 130 Pac. 774 (1913).
ICarpenter v. Beal-McDonnell & Co., 222 Fed. 453 (E. D. Ark. 1915). The test of a
right to recover on a cause of action arising out of a wagering contract is whether the plain-
tiff needs aid from the illegal transaction to establish his case. McDaniel v. Tulles, ii S. W.
(2d) 203 (Tex. 1928). It is interesting to note that a telegraph company is not liable for
loss caused by error in transmitting an order if the transaction is proved illegal. Weld v.
Postal Telegraph Cable Co., i99 N. Y. 88, 92 N. E. 415 (igio). For accountability to owner
of one who receives funds for "bucket-shop" transactions from a third person acting without
authority, see Glasgow v. Nicholls, 124 Wash. 281, 214 Pac. I65 (1923).
"Finley v. Stripling, 15 S. W. (2d) 711 (Tex. 1929) ; Staples v. Gould, 9 N. Y. 520
(i884).
I Kruse v. Kennett, 181 Ill. i99, 54 N. E. 965 (1889) ; Barrell v. Paine, 236 Mass. 157,
128 N. E. 17 (1920). In California, a customer was allowed to maintain replevin to recover
securities deposited as margin in an illegal transaction. Hartuett v. Wilson, 31 Cal. App. 678,
161 Pac. 281 (1916). "
I Zembler v. Fitzgerald, 234 Mass. 236, 125 N. E. 299 (1919). But cf. Coughlin v. Ferro,
supra note i. A state statute prohibiting contracts for future delivery in all cases where
margins are deposited is constitutional. Fenner v. Boykin, 3 F. (2d) 674 (N. D. Ga. 1925).
" Scandinavian Import-Export Co. v. Bachman, 195 App. Div. 297, 186 N. Y. Supp. 86o
(i92I). But statutes may prohibit options altogether. Booth v. People, 186 Ill. 43, 57 N. E.
798 (19oo), aff'd as a valid exercise of the police power, 184 U. 5. 425, 22 Sup. Ct. 425
(19o2).14GnM AN, Srocx EXCHANGTE LAW (1923) 128, n. t.
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against market fluctuations by counter-contracts of a like amount of the same
commodity, are held valid, 5 although as to these counter-contracts no actual
delivery is intended, but instead settlements are to be made by set-offs or ringing
off.16 Hedges are distinguished from wagering contracts in that the parties have
an interest other than that arising out of the fictitious transaction.17  The grow-
ing tendency is to consider valid as legitimate speculation contracts for future
delivery even though the parties have no actual transactions to protect, and actual
future delivery is not intended, if the parties intend instead a closing out on a
clearing exchange.' 8 These transactions differ from the instant case in that
instead of being a mere payment of differences, the broker fulfills the orders on
the floor of the exchange where they are set off against counter-orders of a like
nature. Since such contracts greatly resemble wagers, their approval by the courts
must be construed as a recognition of the important part that speculation plays
in modern business.
CONTRACTS-SUBROGATION-'PRIORITY OF A SURETY TO AN ASSIGNEE-A
contractor executed a highway contract with the state, and as required by statute,1
furnished a bond to insure proper performance and satisfaction of labor and
material claims. The contractor agreed with the surety on the bond that in
case of default the surety be subrogated to contractor's rights to payments retained
by the state. Later the contractor assigned his right to receive payments to a
bank which gave notice to the state. Due to the insolvency of the contractor, the
surety had to satisfy labor and material claims. Held, that the surety's rights to
the retained payments were superior to those of the bank. Appeal of Lancaster
County Bank, 304 Pa. 437, 155 Atl. 859 (i3i).
When the second of two assignees gives first notice to the assignor's debtor,
the New York view is that "prior in time is prior in right",2 subject to several
exceptions.3 The other view, that the one giving first notice is entitled to
priority,4 seems preferable since it tends to promote free assignability of choses
' Browne v. Thorne, supra note 4; Lyons Milling Co. v- Goffe, supra note 3; Edgely v.
Spitzer, 48 N. D. 406, 184 N. W. 88o (1921). Contra: Falk v. Mercantile Co., 138 Miss. 21,
102 So. 843 (1925).
3" See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236, 247, 249, 25 Sup. Ct.
637, 638, 639 (19o).
1 For an interesting and complete discussion of hedging contracts in relation to gambling,
see Patterson, Hedging and Wagering on Produce Exchanges (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 843.
'"Cleage v. Laidley, 149 Fed. 3461 (C. C. A. 8th, igo6) ; Mullinix v. Hubbard; Lyons
Milling Co. v. Goffe, both supra note 3; Gettys v. Newburger, 272 Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 8th,
1921) ; Riordan v. McCabe, 341 Ill. 5o6, 173 N. E. 66o (193o). It has also been held that
contracts reserving to the seller the right to claim the difference between the contract and
market price at the time and place of delivery are valid, since such difference is the legal
measure of damages. Washburn Crosby Co. v. Riccobono, 162 La. 698, iii So. 65 (1926) ;
Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Jacobs, 170 Wis. 389, 175 N. W. 796 (1920).
'AcT 1921, P. L. 65o and amendment Acr 1929, P. L. 159o.
'Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182, 44 Sup. Ct. 266 (1924) ;
Ottumwa Boiler Works v. M. J. O'Meara and Son, 26 Iowa 577, 218 N. W. 920 (1928) ;
Central Trust Co. v. WesfA India, Improvement Co., 169 N. Y. 314, 62 N. E. 387 (9ol) ;
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRAcrs (Am. L. Inst. Official Draft No. I, 1928) § 173, C.
3 Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How. 61z (U. S. 1854) (second assignee reduces claim to a
judgment in his Own name); N. Y. & New Haven R. R. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30 (1865)
(second assignee effects a novation with the debtor) ; Central Trust Co. v. West India Im-
provement Co., supra note 2 (second assignee receives payment from the debtor in good
faith) ; Mills v. Rossiter, 156 Cal. 167, 1O3 Pac. 896 (i9o9) (second assignee obtains the
document which is in the form of a specialty).
' Phillip's Estate (No. 3), 205 Pa. 5,5, 55 Atl. 213 (1903) ; Foster v. Cockerell, 3 Cl. &
Fin. 456 (H. L., 1835). See CoRiN, Assignment of Contract Rights (1926) 74"U. OF PA.
L. REv. 207. . , I
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in action, which facilitates business. There is a limitation, however, on both
theories, based on the fundamental principle that an assignee's rights rise no
higher than those of his assignor.5 A surety, who fulfills the assignor's obliga-
tions because of his default, is entitled to an equity in the funds due the con-
tractor 6 which equity attaches at the very time the surety contract was made.7
Thus the assignee must take his assignment subject to this equity; and he neces-
sarily acquired nothing, since his assignor possessed only a right to the fund in
the event of performance. A practical reason given for this conclusion is that
the surety is compelled to pay labor and material claims because of its bond,
whereas the bank is under no obligation to advance sums to the contractor.8
Another solution advanced is that the statute requiring the surety bond is, as a
matter of law, deemed notice of the surety's rightsY The instant case establishes
a precedent in Pennsylvania,' though many similar cases have been decided
in other jurisdictions. It is in accord with those decisions, not on the ground of
priority of assignees, but rather upon the basis of the equitable doctrine of subro-
gation.
CoRpoRATIoNs-FoREIGN CORPORATIONS-LABILITY or AGENTS AND MEM-
BERS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH LOCAL STATuTE-s-Plaintiff sued on a note
signed by defendants as officers of a foreign corporation, which note was given
for a conveyance of land by plaintiff. A statute made it a misdemeanor to act for
a foreign corporation in acquiring land within the state before registering.'
Defendant's corporation had not complied with the statute when the note was
given. The supreme court held defendants liable as partners. Held (on rehear-
ing), that defendants could not be charged with personal liability, because under
an amendment,2 the sale of the land to the corporation was valid. Herbert H.
Pape, Inc. v. Finch, 136 So. 496 (Fla. 1931).
The right of a foreign corporation to enter and carry on business within a
state other than that in which it was incorporated, is generally qualified in the
several states by statutes.' Some of these statutes expressly declare acts of a
corporation in violation thereof void.4 but others merely penalize the corporation
'Monona County v. O'Connor, 2o5 Iowa 1119, 215 N. W. 803 (i928); Union Indemnity
Co. v. City of New Smyrna, 130 So. 453 (Fla. i93o).
'Lacy v. Md. Casualty Co., 32 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929); Union Indemnity Co. v.
City of New Smyrna, suapra note 5; State v. Schlesinger, 114 Ohio St. 323, 151 N. E. 177
(1926).
7 Canton Exchange Bank v. Yazoo County, 144 Miss. 579, 109 So. I (1926).
Henningsen v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 208 U. S. 404, 28 Sup. Ct. 389 (907);
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Langston, i8o Ark. 643, 22 S. W. (2d) 381 (1929).
'Henningsen v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra note 8; Md. Casualty Co. v. Dula-
ney Lumber Co., 23 F. (2d) 378 (C. C. A. 5th, x928) ; Derby v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 87 Ore. 34, i69 Pac. 500 (1917).
"0 But cf. Wells v. Philadelphia, 270 Pa. 42, 112 Atl. 867 (i921).. Also cf. Mock, Trus-
tee v. Bechtel, ioi Pa. Super. i81 (i93o), in which case the surety did not recover, since the
contract itself with the township contained no provision for the protection of the laborers
or materialmen; nor was there any statutory obligation to do so, as the statute, supra note i,
is applicable only to state highways.
:'FLA. GEr. LAws (S'killiman 1927) §§ 6o26, 6029.
2 Ibid. § 7449.
'Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239 U. S. 56o, 36 Sup. Ct. 168 (1915). They must
not, however, impose undue restrictions on interstate commerce. Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U. S. I, 30 Sup. Ct. 190 (i91o). But cf. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 5i Sup. Ct. 201 (193I).
"Diamond Glue Co. v. U. S. Glue Co., io3 Fed. 838 (E. D. Wis. 1900) ; BAAiTIXE,
PwivATE CoaroAxiroxs (i9a7) 858.
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or those assuming to act for it.' In most states, such penalties are held to be
exclusive, and contracts made in the name of a noncomplying corporation are
held valid, though unenforceable by the corporation. A number of jurisdictions,
however, interpret the statutes as voiding contracts made in violation of their
provisions, and make those acting in the name of the corporation personally
liable. In some of these states, this liability is based upon the rule that an agent
is liable on contracts to which he has failed to bind his principal. 7 Other of
these minority jurisdictions, refusing to recognize the legal existence of non-
complying corporations, impose partnership liability on agents, officers, and even
stockholders who have not participated in making the contracts.8 The decision
in the instant case, while rested upon a legislative distinction between the pur-
chase of land and the transaction of other business, achieves a result consistent
with the weight of authority. The court indicates, however, that, but for this
distinction, precedent would have compelled them to hold defendants liable as
partners. It would seem, therefore, that the court very wisely availed itself of
an opportunity to avoid adding weight to a doctrine which is becoming more
generally recognized as an unfair rule.9
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-IDENTITY OF OFFENSES-SUcCESSIVE SALES TO
FEDERAL AGENT-Defendant was indicted for violating the Harrison Narcotics
Act. The second and third counts charged sales to a federal decoy, on successive
days, of morphine not in an original stamped package; the fifth count, based on
the same sale as count two, alleged a failure to receive the written order required
by the Act. Held (one judge dissenting), that each of these counts charged a
separate and independent crime punishable by the maximum penalty fixed by the
Act. Blockburger v. United States, 5o F. (2d) 795 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
It is recognized that a series of similar criminal acts, each being committed in
close proximity to the others and forming a part of one transaction are separately
punishable.' Each act as committed constitutes an indictable crime.2  In the
instant case, since the two unlawful sales involved the same parties with a very
short interval of time separating the two acts, the dissenting judge would con-
5 Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Moser, 159 S. W. ioi8 (Tex. 1913); Ryerson v. Shaw,
277 Ill. 524, 115 N. E. 650 (1917).
'Beal v. Childress, 92 Kans. 109, 139 Pac. ix98 (1914) ; American Soap Co. v. Bogue,
114 Ohio St. i49, I5o N. E. 743 (1926); 2 MoRvwErz, PrvATE CoRpoRAnoNs (2d ed. 1886)
§665.
"Ryerson v. Shaw, supra note 5; Lasher v. Stimson, i45 Pa. 30, 23 Atl. 552 (1892);
Raff v. Isman, 235 Pa. 347, 84 Atl. 352 (I912).
'Taylor v. Branham, 35 Fla. 297, 17 So. 552 (i89.q); Hill v. Beach, 12 N. J. Eq. 31
(1858) ; Cunnyngham v. Shelby, 136 Tenn. 76, 188 S. W. 1147 (i9i6). In one instance, it
has been held that innocent stockholders are liable for torts of those acting for the non-
complying corporation. Rowden v. Daniell, IMi Mo. App. 15, 132 S. W. 23 (i9IO). I COOK,
STOCK & STOCKHOLDERS (3d ed. 1894) § 223; MoRwErz, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 874; Ladd,
Liability of Indiiduuds, etc. (i93o) i5 IowA L. R. 285; Note (1917) 27 -YAL L. J. 248,
9 In the instant case, at 504, two judges concurring specially favored the rejection of the
precedent of Taylor v. Branham, supra note 8. "'It is to be noted that our statute penalizes
the doing of business here without qualifying but does not make the contracts void. It would
seem, if the agent in the name of his principal made a valid and binding contract, such agent
ought not to be held personally liable where the party with whom he is dealing is put on notice
that he is dealing with a corporation ..
IEbeling v. Morgan, 237 U. S. 625. 35 Sup. Ct. 710 (1915) ; Badders v. United States,
240 U. S. 391, 36 Sup. Ct 367 (I9i6); United States v. Carpenter, 1S Fed. 214 (N. D.
Wash. I907).
'Johnson v. Commonwealth, 2O Ky. 314, 256 S. W. 388 (1923), held that each deal in a
continuous game of cards is a violation of a gambling statute.
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sider them as one offense.3 A prosecution for an offense which consists of a
series of acts extending over a period of time bars a further prosecution for that
crime occurring in any portion of that period,4 or for any time prior to the institu-
tion of the first prosecution.5 Since the nature of the crime is a series of successive
acts, each act forming but a part of the complete crime, the law permits but one
conviction for the crime during the stated period.6 But where, as in the principal
case, the periods of time covered by the indictments are entirely distinct and
where the acts, in themselves, constitute offenses, this doctrine should not be
applied. Where a single act violates two separate statutory provisions, the deci-
sions have held that, if the offenses are not identical, separate convictions do not
violate the Fifth Amendment.7 The test of identity is: "Will the evidence neces-
sary to sustain a conviction for the first crime be sufficient to convict under the
second indictment?" 8 Since the court in the principal case, following the major-
ity view,9 interprets the Narcotic Act as intending to punish, not the sale of nar-
cotics,10 but the failure to fulfill the requirements for sale thereof,1 it follows
that one act violating several sections of the Narcotics Act is indictable for
each separate offense.'2 Inasmuch as Federal courts have, at different times,
'The dissenting judge in the principal case would consider the two sales as a "continuous
performance" constituting but a single crime, citing from p. 799, ". . . if in the detecting
process the government sees fit to make an installment affair of it, I do not think the govern-
ment is in position to say that each insallment of such a general operation constitutes a sepa-
rate crime."
'State v. Whitaker, 48 La. Ann. 527, 19 So. 457 (1896).
'In re Snow, 120 U. S. 274, 7 Sup. Ct. 556 (x887).
'In re Snow, supra note 5 (unlawful cohabitation with woman) ; People v. Cox,,io7
Mich. 439, 65 N. W. 283 (i895) (keeping a disorderly house); Muckenfuss v. State, 55 Tex.
Cr. 229, ii6 S. W. 51 (I909) (violation of statute prohibiting carrying on business on Sun-
day).
I "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." The "double jeopardy" provision of the Fifth Amendment does not apply
when the Penal Code makes two offenses possible in one transaction, Morgan v. Devine, 237
U. S. 632, 35 Sup. Ct. 712 (1915).
8Ibid. The rule has been stated in the converse form that the crimes are not identical
where the evidence necessary to establish a conviction under the second indictment would not
have supported an indictment in the first prosecution. See CLARK, CIMINAL PROCEDURE
(Mikell's ed. 1918) 457. It should be noted that under certain circumstances the result will
vary according to which rule is applied. A third rule was stated in Morey v. Commonwealth,
io8 Mass. 433, 434 (1871), "The test is, not whether the defendant has already been tried for
the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense."
' Solomon v. United States, 26 F. (2d) 554 (D. C. 1928) ; McIntosh v. White, 21 F. (2d)
934 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; Parmagini v. United States, 42 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A. 9th, i93o) ;
see (1930) 25 ILi. L. Rsx. 825. In Braden v. United, States, 270 Fed. 44i (C. C. A. 8th,
I92O), the court refused to allow several convictions where several kinds of drugs were sold
in one package. But cf. Gillenwaters v. Biddle, i8 F. (2d) 2o6 (C. C. A. 8th, i9n7), where
the same court held that the transportation of four women at the same time in interstate com-
merce for purposes of prostitution constituted four crimes.
" Ballerini v. Aderholt, 44 F. (2d) 352, at 353 (C. C. A. 5th, i93o), "At last it was the
sale, and not the failure to register, pay the tax, or secure the written order, that constituted
the offense".
' Principal case at 797---"Neither the sale, the failure to register, pay the tax, or secure
the written order, in and of itself constitutes a crime, but the sale in conjunction with either
the failure to register, pay the tax or secure the written order does constitute a separate
crime."
"This reasoning is entirely in accord with the trend of recent decisions on similar Fed-
eral statutes where violations of several- sections of the same statute are adjudged separate
crimes: Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. I, 47 Sup. Ct. 250 (927) (National Prohibition
Act) ; Roark v. United States, 17 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 8th, x927) (Mann White Slave
Act) ; United States v. Hampden, 294 Fed. 345 (E. D. Mich. 1923) (National Motor Vehicle
Theft Act) : United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 Fed. 836 (S. D. N. Y. 1907)
(Sherman Anti-Trust Act).
RECENT CASES
held that two successive offenses of the same kind are separately indictable
and, similarly, that two offenses growing out of the same act are individ-
ually punishable, there is no reason why these principles should not be followed
where both circumstances occur in the same case.
DEATH-LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURY AS
AFFECTING ACTION FOR DEATH RESULTING FROm THAT iNjURY-PENNSYL-
VANIA DEATH ACTS OF 1851 AND I855-Plaintiff, in 1927, sued under a death
statute,1 alleging that her husband died in 1926 from injuries caused by negligence
of defendant in i9o5. Defendant contended that although the statute said suit
may be brought within one year after the death, yet the plaintiff widow had no
cause of action since the Statute of Limitations would have been a defense
to an action by the decedent. Held, that the widow had no cause of action.
Howard v. The Bell Telephone Co., 15 D. & C. 411 (Pa. i93).
At common law, the right of action for an injury to the person abated
upon the death of the person injured,2 but most of the American states have
adopted statutes 8 similar to Lord Campbell's Act,4 which gave an action for the
death to certain designated individuals. It is generally held that the beneficiary
is given a new and distinct cause of action 5 and hence the failure of the decedent
to bring his action for injuries within the limitation period is no bar to an action
by his representatives. 6  Some of the contrary authorities can be explained on
the basis of the statutes involved, which stipulate that the survivor can only
recover if the decedent could have maintained an action for personal injuries at
the time of his death. The Pennsylvania statute in the instant case has no such
stipulation. A federal court applying this same statute came to a conclusion
opposite to that of the principal case.7  The federal court clearly distinguished the
right of action given by the statute from the right of action of the decedent,
although the same injury is the cause of action for both. If anything occurs to
destroy the decedent's cause of action, such as his securing a judgment on it or
signing a release, then the survivor never gets a cause of action. But the defense
of the Statute of Limitations does not affect the decedent's cause of action, al-
though it may bar his right of action, and hence the survivor still has a good
cause of action. It might be true that this suggested result is unfortunate since
one who causes an injury should be able to know the time in the future when he
will be free and secure from claims, but the remedy for this defect lies not with
the courts but with the legislature.
INJUNCTIONS-LABoR UNIONS--- YELLOW DoG7" CONTRACTS-E-NJOINING
ATTEmpTs OF THIRD PARTIES TO INDUCE BREACH OF CONTRACT-Plaintiff had
its employees sign contracts in which the employee promised to withdraw from the
,Act of April 15, 1851, P. L. 669, § i9 and Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 309, § 2. V
2 Pulling v. Rwy. Co., [1882] 92 B. D. 11o; Hadley v. Bryars' Admr., 58 Ala. 185 (1877).
3 Tn=ANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL AcT (2d ed. 1913) §§ 19, 24.
a9 and IO Vicr., c. 93 (1846).
For a discussion of the rights created by these statutes see Note (1915) 64 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 629.
aNestelle v. Northern P. R. Co., 56 Fed. 261 (1893) ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Preston, 254 Fedi 229 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918) ;1 Homewicz v. Orlouski, 143 Ati. 250 (1928) ;
Donnelly v. Chicago City R. Co.. 163 Ill. App. 7 (19o7) ; German American Trust Co. v.
Lafayette Box Board and Paper Co., 52 Ind. App. 211, 98 N. E: 874 (1912). Contra: Kelli-
her v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 212 N. Y. 207, 1O5 N. E. 824 (1914); Williams v.
Mersey Docks & Harbour Bd., [1905] 1 K. B. 804.
7 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Preston, supra note 6.
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plaintiff's employment before joining a union. Defendant, knowing of these
contracts, by speeches and pamphlets induced seven of plaintiff's employees to
join a union. These employees were discharged and a strike resulted. Picketing
and intimidation followed in which the defendant joined. Before the strike,
relations between plaintiff and its employees had been satisfactory.1 Held (one
judge concurring,2 one dissenting,'), that defendant be enjoined from using
intimidation, from sending scandalous connunications, and from picketing to
induce employees to break their contracts or to unionize plaintiff's factory.
Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Federation of Hosiery Workers, Appeal of
Lewis Francis Budenz, decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, October
9, 193'.
In granting an injunction the instant case follows the Hitchman 4 case and
the authorities in most states ' except New York.6 The decree is perhaps less
sweeping than ordinarily, 7 for the original injunction was modified to allow
defendant his constitutional right of free speech 8 to persuade plaintiff's employees
to join a union, even though they would therefore in accordance with the
'It would appear that these were the operative facts, although in labor disputes one cannot
say with assurance that anything less than all the circumstances led the court to its decision.2 Kephart, J., thought that, although there was no consideration for the employees' prom-
ises, the defendant should be enjoined, because he had interfered with the employer-employee
relation in attempting to unionize the plant by unlawful means (picketing and distributing
pamphlets in person). According to accepted principles there was consideration for the
promises in the fact of employment. It is true that, in New York Exchange Bakery v. Lif-
kin, 245 N. Y. 26o, i57 N. E. 130 (1927) and Interborough Rapid Transit v. Lavin, 247 N. Y.
65, 159 N. E. 863 (1928), the contrary was held, but few reasons were advanced (criticized in
The Present Status of the Hitchman Case, infra note 4) and the misconstruction was to
reach a holding opposite to that of Kephart, J. Cf. Interborough Rapid Transit v. Green,
131 N. Y. Misc. 682 (1928) with Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7 (1915) and
U. S. Guaranty Co. v. Millonas, 2o6 Ala. 147, 89 So. 732 (1921).
See on the employer-employee relation, Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (Q923) 36
HAgv. L. RLv. 663 and Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations (1928) 41 HAv. L.
REv. 728. Kephart, J., in. effect adopts the minority view that picketing is per se unlawful.
See (1915) 62 U. OF PA. L. REv. 665, and (19o2) 15 HARV. L. RFv. 482; cf. American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, 257 U. S. i84, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921) (decree limiting
number of picketers).
'Maxey, J., stressed the following points : (I)-the evidence-that the hours were un-
conscionable, that the workers were not satisfied, that they were virtually forced to sign,
that there had been no violence; (2)-the contracts-(a) that the plaintiff did not have
clean hands; see ('93o) 25 IL. L. REv. 93; NOMx (93o) 43 H.Av. L- REV. 1120; (b) that
there was duress and undue influence, but cf. Lyon v. Huckabee, 16 Wall. 414, 432 (1872) ;
Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 55 (x85o) ; but should common law tests be applied in this sit-
uation? -see Pound, Liberty of Contract (19o9) 18 YALE L. J. 454; (c) that there was
no consideration; see supra note 2; (d) that the contracts were contrary to public policy;
contra: Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. I, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (1914); Montgomery v. Pacific
Electric Ry., 293 Fed. 68o (S. D. Cal. 1923) ; (3)-free speech-that, as no violence had
been done, there was nothing to enjoin and the court had taken away the defendant's right
of free speech; see Art. I, sec. 7 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
'I-Iitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1916). On the
other hand, this case has been distinguished in the Tri-City case, supra note 2, and Carey and
Oliphant in their article The Present Status of the Hitchnan Case (1929) 29 COL. L. Rxv.
44I, conclude that the Federal courts are now in accord with New York, supra note 2.
5 Flaccus v. Smith, i99 Pa. 128, 48 Atl. 894 (i9o) ; Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle
Blowers' Ass'n, 77 N. J. Eq. 219, 79 Atl. 262 (191o) ; Tracey v. Osborne, 226 Mass. 25, 114
N. E. 954 (1917) (here the contract protected was between the employer and a particular
union).
'Exchange Bakery v. Lifkin; Interborough Rapid Transit v. Lavin, both supra note 2.
7The Hitchman case, supra note 4, and Flaccus case, supra note 5, in effect, at least, en-
joined interfering "in any way" with the complainant's business, as did the original decree in
the instant case. See the article of Frankfurter and Greene, infra note 12, in 45 L. Q. REv.,
beginning at p. 24, where it deals with the scope of injunctions in labor disputes.
'The right of free speech reserved in Art. I, sec. 7 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
See the articles of Sayre and Carpenter, supra note 2.
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-terms of their contract be bound to give up their employment, so long as
he did so in a proper manner and at an appropriate time. The
court was careful to point out that this did not involve the right of
persuading the employees to break their contracts. Without raising any ques-
tion as to the correctness of the result, the attempt to decide a labor problem,
such as this, by the application of principles of common law and equity '
is not entirely satisfactory. The rules of common law and equity were fashioned
to settle disputes between two, or at most a few, pers)ns-no broad issues of
policy were involved-whereas a labor dispute not only involves many people,
but raises the question of our whole philosophy of social life.10 The right to
strike and the right of free speech conflict with the right of the employer to
carry on his business. To attempt to solve such a conflict by a mere qualification
of the conflicting individual rights 11 cannot be adequate, as it ignores the larger
issues which should control. If such conflicts were resolved .by attacking the
larger issues involved, d more correct delimitation of the rights involved should
result, and a set of principles applicable to the solution of broad social problems
should develop, just as the principles of the common law have developed from set-
tling disputes between a few persons.1 2
INSuRANcE-PRooFs OF Loss-TIME AS OF THE ESSENcE-A fire insurance
policy provided that no suit should be maintainable thereon "until after full
compliance by the insured with all the foregoing requirements", one of which
was that proofs of loss must be furnished the insurer within sixty days. A stat-
ute 1 stated that "time is never considered as of the essence of a contract, unless
by its terms expressly so provided." The insured did not furnish his proofs of
loss until seven months after the fire had occurred. Held, that the insured cannot
recover, since the time limitation was of the essence of the contract. Niagara
' Since Temperton v. Russell (1893) I Q. B. 715, the law has been settled that it is a
tort maliciously to induce a party to any contract to break it; "maliciously" means withofit
just cause and bona fide altruism is not a just cause, Read v. Friendly Society of Stonema-
sons [19o2] 2 K. B. 88. Where the legal remedy is inadequate, equity will of course protect
the contract.
" The very existence of labor unions is an example of the relation between law and our
philosophy of social life, for at common law a combination of workmen to secure better con-
ditions was an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade, Rex v. Journeymen Tailors of Cam-
bridge, 8 Mod. IO, 88 Eng. Rep. 9 (12I) and the cases in SAYxe, CASES Ox LABOR LAW
(1923) under the title "Legality of Combination". Labor unions are now legal because they
fit into our theory of social organization. Since at the basis of all labor cases there exists a
disregard of a fundamental common law principle, how is it that common law principles can
be fitted to determine problems involving this element which is essentially antagonistic to
them? Similarly, Prof. Dickinson, in his ADMIiISTRATIVE JUSTICS AND THE SUPREMACY OF
LAW (1927) pP. 211-214 raises the question whether, because of the broad issues involved,
the principles of the common law are suited for solving questions of public utility law.
' Thus in Massachusetts the courts will allow strikes-for higher wages or better condi-
tions, Minasian v. Osborne, 210 Mass. 250, 96 N. E. 1036 (19I), but not to extend the in-
fluence of the upion, Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336, 94 N. E. 316 (1911) ; see (1930) 78 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 430. In New York the courts take a much broader view and allow strikes for
this purpose, Exchange Bakery v. Lifkin; Interborough Rapid Transit v. Lavin, both supra
note 2; see Note (1921) 34 ItAlv. L. R v. 88o.
" For a general historical- treatment and discussion of the development and use of the
injunction in labor disputes in this country, see Frankfurter and Green, Use of the Injunction
in American Labor Controversies (1928) 44 L. Q. REv. 164 (substantive law), ibid. 353
(procedure) (1929) 45 ibid. 19 (scope of injunction) ; or FRANKFURTER AND GREEN, THE
LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
S. D. Rxv. CODE (1919) § 888.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Fire Ins. Co. v. Pospisil, U. S. Daily, October 5, 1931, at 1766, (C. C. A. 8th,
'93').
It is fundamental that the parties must abide by the terms of the contract
which they have themselves made,2 but this rule, as applied to those terms of con-
tracts of insurance which operate after the loss insured against has occurred, is
very liberally construed. Thus, mfiost courts restrain any attempt by the insurer
to deny indemnification because of the non-compliance by the insured with
the provision that proofs of loss must be furnished within a specified time, and
hold instead that the only effect of such non-compliance is to postpone the day
of payment pro tanto3 Usually recovery is allowed on the ground that in the
absence of an express provision that non-compliance with the time limitation
should work a forfeiture of the policy, the intention of the parties was that it
was not of the essence of the contract, even in the face of a provision that no
suit should be maintainable unless 4 all the terms had been complied with.' This
attitude of the courts is probably based upon a long-standing experience with the
fact that the insured seldom reads or fully understands the technical details of
the policy, and upon an unwillingness to work a forfeiture for the failure to per-
form some technicality. The feeling prevails that the insurer is not prejudiced
by the delay if the proofs are furnished within the time limited for bringing
the action, and that the occurrence of the very loss insured against has matured
an inchoate right.6 The intention of the legislature in passing a statute such
as the one in question was obviously to give legislative sanction to this attitude
of the courts, and the effect of the decision in the principal case can only be to
nullify such intention by judicial legislation.7
2"It" is enough that the parties have made certain terms conditions on which their con-
tract shall continue or terminate. The courts may not make a contract for the parties. Their
function and duty consists simply in enforcing and carrying out the one actually made.' Im-
perial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U. S. 452, 462, 14 Sup. Ct. 379, 381 (1893).
'Dixon v. State Mutual Ins. Co., 34 Okla. 624, 126 Pac. 794 (1912); Mason v. Saint
Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 82 Minn. 336, 85 N. W. 13 (Io1) ; VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
VF INSURAN CE (2d ed. 193o) 786.
'As an example of how astute some courts are to find loopholes through which the in-
sured who has not complied with some technical provision of the policy may crawl to recov-
ery, a distinction has been drawn betweer; "until after all the foregoing requirements have
been complied with" and "unless, etc.' Those courts drawing the distinction have held that
"until after" imported an order or sequence rather than an intent to make performance within
the time specified the essence of the requirement. Steele v. German Ins. Co., 93 Mich. 8I,
53 N. W. 514 1892). (Italics the writer's).
5 "If the policy was to be avoided or the company not liable in case of failure to furnish
the statement in sixty days, why did not the policy so state . . .? Forfeitures are not
favored, and courts do not declare one by implication." Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Colorado
Leasing, etc. Co., 5o Col. 424, 116 Pac. 154 (1911) ; Indian River State Bank v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 46 Fla. 283, 35 So. 228 (i9o3) ; Rynalski v. Insurance Co., 96 Mich. 395, 55 N.
W. 981 (1893).
This is a fortiori true if the policy provides a forfeiture for failure to comply with other
provisions, but is silent as to the one in question. See Steele v. German Ins. Co., supra note
ti; Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Colorado Leasing, etc. Co., supra note 5; 5 JOYCE, THE LAW
OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1918) § 3282; VANCE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 787.
' Dixon v. State Mutual Ins. Co., supra note 4; (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. Rmv. 356.
But such a feeling minimizes the importance of promptness in serving the proofs of loss.
The insurer heeds them to (i) inform himself of the scope of his liability; (2) to aid in de-
tecting any possible felonious origin of the fire; (3) to gather evidence to contest the claim;
and (4) to prevent the insured from increasing the damage. See VAncE, op. cit. supra note
4, at 781.
I The court in the principal case adopted the interpretation of the Supreme Court of
South Dakota in Phillis v. Gross, 32 S. D. 438, 143 N. W. 373 (1913), to the effect that
whether or not time is of the essence of a contract, under the statute, depends upon the inten-
tion of the parties and the object to be attained by the contract, rather than upon the express
declarations of the parties contained therein.
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MARRIAGE - ANNULMENT - EQUITABLE DISABILITIES - REQUISITE OF
"CLEAN HANDS"--Petitioner, after learning that at the time of a ceremonial
marriage to him defendant was legally married to another, had continued marital
relations with her for three years. He then sued for. annulment. Held, that
petitioner should be denied relief since he had "unclean hands", in that he had
consciously lived in adultery with defendant. Ancrum v. Ancrum, I56 Atl. 22
(N. J. 1931).
Equity in many cases will apply the "clean hands" doctrine with the con-
trolling purpose of punishing a petitioner who has acted inequitably in his rela-
tions to the subject-matter of his suit, by denying him any affirmative relief.1
Improper conduct in the marriage relationship will generally bar the petitioner
'from the right to relief in suits connected therewith,2 especially the right to secure
a divorce 3 or an annulment of a voidable marriage.4 Thus a divorce will not
be granted a petitioner guilty of adultery. In such cases the denial of the decree
penalizes the petitioner by forcing him to continue a relationship the obligations
of which he might have avoided but for his own misconduct, although the wisdom
of such a form of punishment is doubtful.6 The denial of a decree of annulment
of a bigamous marriage does not, however, have the same punitive effect, since
a bigamous marriage is absolutely void without judicial declaration,7 and the
decree of annulment in such cases is merely a declaration of an existing status."
To withhold the decree makes no change in the rights of the parties,9 and pun-
ishes the petitioner only to the extent of denying him an immediate judicial
declaration of his status.'0 To grant the decree, on the other hand, clears the
'The maxim is perhaps more familiar in its application to prevent the culmination of a
transaction affected by the misconduct of the petitioner in which cases it supplements the
maxim that "he who seeks equity must do equity", and clearly accomplishes a valuable end in
withholding the means of securing the reward of wrongful conduct. See I POMEROY, EQurrY
JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1905) 657. But the maxim is also often applied solely as a means
of punishing antecedent misconduct. In one of the earliest cases involving the maxim, the
right to relief from forfeiture for waste was made to depend on the intent of the petitioner at
the time of committing the waste: FRANcrs, MAXIMs OF EQUITY (2d ed. 1739) 6, case 3.
In Freda v. Bergman, 77 N. J. Eq. 46, 49 76 Atl. 460, 462 (igio) it was expressly recognized
that the maxim may be purely punitive in effect Such an indirect method of punishment
seems to be inappropriate to the court of equity, as it cannot repair the wrong done, and
allows defendants to raise issues not really relevant to the matter in controversy. See Note
(1922) 35 HAgv. L. REv. 754.
2 FRANcIs, op. cit. supra note I, at 7, case 8 (adulterous wife denied relief in suit against
husband for diversion of rents reserved for her by husband) ; Black v. Black, 30 N. J. Eq.
215 (1878) (deserting wife denied property rights against husband). The rule has always
been recooized in the ecclesiastical courts: Beeby v. Beeby, I Hag. Ecc. 789, 790 (179g).
The defense of recrimination in divorce proceedings is -based on the "clean hands"
maxim: Hoff v. Hoff, 48 Mich. 281, 12 N. W. i6o (1882).
'Stokes v. Stokes, 128 App. Div. 838, 113 N. Y. Supp. 142 (19o8) (decree refused to
petitioner who lived with wife though he knew of infirmity in their marriage), rev'd in 198
N. Y. 301, 91 N. E. 793 (IIO) on the grourd that the marriage was not voidable but void,
therefore the decree of nullity was mandatory.
'Pease v. Pease, 72 Wis. 136, 39 N. W. 133 (1888).
'It is doubtful in two aspects :-first, should equity take it upon itself to punish when
the wrongdoer can effectively be punished as a criminal; and second, granted that equity
should punish, is it conducive to the welfare of the state that the fundamental institution of
marriage be used for that purpose?
Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. 550 (U. S. 1848) ; Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Ill. 388,
12 N. E. 737 (1887); Freda v. Bergman, sipra note I; I BIsHoP, MARRIAGE, DiVORCE AND
SEPARATION (891) 310.
'Patterson v. Gaines, supra note 6; Freda v. Bergman, supra note I; Heflinger v. Heflin-
ger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S. E. 316 (1923).
'Simmons v. Simmons, ig F. (2d) 69o (Ct. of App., D. C. 1927); Freda v. Bergman,
supra note I.
"Patterson v. Gaines, supra note 6; Freda v. Bergman, supra note I ; Heflinger v. Hef-
linger, supra note 7. The withholding of the decree is no more than an inconvenience to the
petitioner, since a bigamous marriage may b6 collaterally attacked at any time: Patterson v.
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record and finally settles a relationship in which the state is interested; 11 for
this reason, many courts have held it mandatory on them to annul a bigamous
marriage at the earliest opportunity, regardless of the equitable position of the
one seeking the decree. 12  This course clearly seems the only logical one to pur-
sue.' 8 The denial of the decree, as in the principal case, fails to operate as an
effective punishment and leaves all the parties concerned in an anomalous and
confusing position.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ToRTS--INJuRIES IN MUNICIPAL BUILDING
CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT EMPLOY- Plaintiff was injured as a result of the negli-
gence of a janitor in the city treasurer's office. The taxes collected in this office
were expended by the city for its corporate as well as its governmental activities.
Held, that the city is liable. Baty v. Binghamton, 252 N. Y. Supp. 263 (I93i).
That the liability of'a municipal corporation for the torts of its servants was
dependent on whether that servant was engaged in a private or corporate rather
than a governmental function was once hornbook law.3 This is not nearly
so certain now as it was even a few years ago. The reason given for the doc-
trine of non-liability was that a quasi-governmental agency was in no condition
to withstand attacks on its limited treasury without seriously hampering or even
destroying its usefulness.' With the growth in power and wealth of these cor-
Gaines, supra note 6; Simmons v. Simmons, supra note 8. It would seem, therefore, that in
denying the petitioner his decree, the court is inflicting no more than a formal reproof on
him.
The state is interested in the protection of possible issue by remarriage: Freda v. Berg-
man, supra note I; the preservation of good order in society: In re Gregorson, i6o Cal. 23,
116 Pac. 6o (i91i) ; and the establishment by estoppel of a final record as to the status of the
parties while the proof is still available: Powell v. Powell, 18 Kans. 371 (877) ; Rooney v.
Rooney, 54 N. J. Eq. 231, 34 Atl. 682 (1896) ; Heflinger v. Heflinger, supra note 7. A force-
ful statement of the expediency of granting the decree of annulment of a void marriage was
made in Martin v. Martin, 54 W. Va. 301, 3o2, 46 S. E. 120 (19o3): "Their hands may be
unclean, but it is the duty of a court of equity to permit them to clean them when it can do
so, and not permit such uncleanness to continue as a stench in the nostrils of the people."
'Simmons v. Simmons, supra note 8; Lynch v. Lynch, 34 R. I. 261, 83 Atl. 83 (1912).
In these cases and many others, the decree was granted to the bigamous party himself, the
public interest in securing the decree being so strong as to overcome the principle that a peti-
tioner should be estopped from asserting his own wrong. See I BISHOP, op. cit. supra note
6, at 266; Note (1927) 54 A. L. R. 8o.
See (igog) 9 COL. L. Rxv. 269; Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. Rr-v. 1059. In the well-con-
sidered case of Hunt v. Hunt, 252 Ill. App. 490 (1929) the decree was allowed on facts
identical with the principal case. The New Jersey court, in its anxiety to punish the peti-
tioner for "playing fast and loose with the defendant" (at 23) followed literally the prin-
ciple of stare decisis, citing as binding precedents the cases of Tyll v. Keller, 94 N. J. Eq.
426, 12o Atl. 6 (1923) and Dolan v. Wagner, 95 N. J. Eq. 298, 125 Atl. 2 (1923), although
when these cases were decided they overruled the often-cited case of Davis v. Green, 91 N. J.
Eq. 17, io8 Atl. 772 (i919).
14 DILLON, MUNICn'AL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 1625; 6 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORAT ONs (1913) § 26o4. The subject of governmental liability in tort of which munici-
pal liability is but one phase has been minutely examined by Professor Borchard in a series
of recent articles. Bbrchard, Governmental Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE L. J. i, 129,
229; Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039;
Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort (1928) 28 CoL L. R. 577, 734. A valuable
summary of the material on the subject concerning municipal corporations is contained in
Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of Tort Cases
(X929) 78 U. oF PA. L. Rxv. 8o5 at 81.5 et seq.
'Feezer, op. cit. supra note I, at 818, 819. See also Borchard, Governmental Liability in
Tort (1924) 34 YALE L. J. I at 42 and 129 at 132. Here Professor Borchard discusses other
reasons and justifications for the "rule" and rejects them all as unsound.
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porations this is no longer true. There is today a realization, that, in forcing
the individual citizen to bear all the risk of a defective or negligent administration
of the functions of the municipality, an unjust burden is imposed which is becom-
ing graver as the activities of the municipality become more diversified.3 This
realization is the basis of an enlightened, modern movement to brush aside the
distinctions between governmental and corporate functions, so that the municipal
corporation, and even the state itself, is liable for the torts of employees. This
tendency is dear in the writings of learned commentators on the subject,4 and in
modern legislative enactments.5 Courts, however, are not inclined to ignore
precedent and strike out boldly along this new path. The desired result is, never-
theless, accomplished in many cases by extending the category of corporate func-
tions while continuing to recognize the general "rule" of law.6 Under the factual
situation of the principal case, many courts would have denied liability 7 on the
ground that the janitor's employment arose out of a governmental activity, the
collection of taxes. The New York court, however, not being bound by prior
decisions to call this activity governmental," and refusing to "unscramble the
mixed relations", called attention to the modern trend and followed it by sustain-
ing liability; a striking case where modern, enlightened judicial opinion has over-
come a precedent whose only reason for existence is historical.
NEGLIGENCE-RES IPSA LoQUITUR, A PRESUMPTION OR AN INFERENCE?-
Plaintiff, a guest in defendant's automobile, was injured when the automobile
left the road in rounding a curve and struck a stump. Held, that the jury might
infer negligence from the circumstances of the accident. Chaisson v. Williams,
156 Ati. 154 (Me. i931).
The situations in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be applied are
substantially similar in most jurisdictions,' but its exact probative force is not so
'See Workman v. New York, i79 U. S. 552, 574, 21 Sup. Ct. 212, 220 (19oo). An in-
teresting situation arose in Ohio. In Fowler v. Cleveland, ioo Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72
(i919), a'city was held liable for injuries caused by the negligence of its fire department,
with a strong concurring opinion by Wanamaker, J., proposing the abolition of the theory of
municipal non-liability. This case was expressly overruled by the same court three years
later in Aldrich v. Youngstown, io6 Ohio St. 342, 14o N. E: 164 (1922). 'Wanamaker, J.
(dissenting) reiterated his former position, taken in the Fowler case.
'Borchard, op, cit. supra note 2, at 258; CARDOzo, LAW AND LrxERATuRE (i93) 57;
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE CommON LAW (I92I) 185; BARRY, THE KING CAN Do No
WRONG (1931) I.
IN. Y. Laws 1926, c. 466, sec. I, § 282g; N. Y. CoNs. LAWs (Cahill, i93o) c. 27,
§ 282g; Laws of Pa., 1929, No. 4o3, 61g. For a discussion of federal statutes enlarging
the liability of the federal government for the torts of its employees see Borchard, Govern-
mental Responsibility in Tort; A Proposed Statutory Reform (925) ii A. B. A. J. 495.
'Bowden v. Kansas City, 69 Kan. 587, 77 Pac. 573 (1904) (maintenance of fire station);
Denver v. Porter, 126 Fed. 288 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o3) (street cleaning activities). It is un-
necessary to labor the point but the same tendency appears in cases concerning establishment
of public parks, and even exercise of police power. See Note (1927) 7.5 U. OF PA. L. Rv.
.7 Schwalk's Admr. v. Louisville, 135 Ky. 570, 122 N. W. 86o (i9o9); Kelly v. Boston,
i86 Mass. i65, 71 N. E. 299 (1904) ; Snider v. St. Paul, 5I Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763 (1892).
Contra: Bell v. Pittsburgh, 297 Pa. i85, 146 Atl. 567 (i929) ; Note (1929) 64 A. L. R. 1545.
. The collection of taxes has generally been considered a governmental function.
6 McQun.LAN, op. cit. supra note I, § 2644. In New York cases holding this view, only taxes
expended for governmental activities were involved. These cases were ignored by the court
in the present instance. Lorillard v. Monroe, ii N. Y. 392 (1854) ; see Bank of Common-
wealth v. New York, 43 N. Y. 184, 189 (i87o) ; Tone v. New York, 70 N. Y. 157, i65 (0877).
I The doctrine of res ipsa loqutur-the event speaks for itself-is thus stated by Erle,
C. J.: "Where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his serv-
ants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not happen if those
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certain. A few courts hold that res ipsa loquitur raises a presumption of negli-
gence so strong that it shifts to the defendant the burden of proving that in fact
there was none.2 Other courts state that the application of the rule creates a
presumption requiring the jury to find for the plaintiff in the absence of any
explanation by the defendant, thereby shifting to him the burden of going for-
ward with the issue.3 Still othek courts hold, as did the instant case, that the
manner in which the accident occurs affords circumstantial evidence from which
the jury may, but are not required to, infer negligence.4  The recent Pennsyl-
vania case of Pope v. Reading Coa. took this view despite the Pennsylvania rule
that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable if there is no contractual relation be-
tween the parties.6 The growing tendency is to look upon the doctrine as a basis
from which a jury may draw an inference. 7 That this is the most logical method
of dealing with res ipsa loquitur is apparent. The fundamental ground on which
the doctrine rests is that, since such accidents ordinarily do not occur without
negligence, there is probably negligence in the particular case. Consequently
there would seem to be no particular reason either of logiC or of practical expe-
diency why the courts should create a presumption, for the rule is one of common
sense which a jury can easily apply without the necessity of attaching to it any
artificial value.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS-MOTOR CARRIERS-CONcLUSIVENESS OF
FINDING OF PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION IN ISSUING CERTIFICATE OF CoN-
VENIENCE AND NEcEssITY-The X Bus Company, operating interstate, and the
Y Company, a subsidiary of the Z Railroad Company, which operated interstate
and intrastate, applied simultaneously to the Public Utilities Commissions for cer-
tificates authorizing them to operate an intrastate line by bus over the same high-
way. Although it appeared that the Z Company's revenues had been diminished
by bus competition, the Commission granted only the application of the X Com-
pany. An appeal was brought to the Supreme Court. Held (one justice dissent-
ing), that the order, being "unreasonable and unlawful", should be reversed, and
that the application of the Y Company alone should be granted. Pennsylvania
R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 123 Ohio St. 655, 176 N. E. 573 (1931).
The rapid increase in the last fifteen years of motor carriers for hire, intro-
ducing as it did problems of congestion, damage to highways, and cut-throat
competition,' led the various states to enact statutes requiring motor carriers
who have the management use the proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence
of explanation by the defendants that the accident arose from want of care." Scott v. London
& St. K. Docks Co., 3 H. & C. (Eng.) 596 (1865) ; 4 WIGMoRE, EviDmE~c (198o) 2509. For
the general application of the rule to cases of alleged medical malpractice, see (193
i ) 26 I-.
L. REV. 350; to automobile accidents, see Note (1928) 64 A. L. R. 255.
Pennsylvania applies the rule only to cases where there is a contractual relationship be-
tween the parties. Durning v. Hyman, 286 Pa. 376, 133 Atl. 568 (1926).
2 Motor Sales & Service v. Grasselli Chem. Co., 15 La. App. 353, 131 So. 623 (930);
Durning v. Hyman, 286 Pa. 376, 133 Atl. 568 (1926).
8 Brown v. Davis, 84 Cal. App. 18o, 257 Pac. 877 (1927) ; Edmanson v. Wilmington &
P. Traction Co., 32 Del. 177, 12o Atl. 923 (1923) ; Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Groome, 97 Miss.
201, 52 So. 703 (1910).
' Glowacki v. Northwestern Ohio Ry. & Power Co., x16 Ohio St. 451, 157 N. E. 21
(1927) ; Ryan v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 168 Minn. 287, 21o N. W. 32 (1926).
5 304 Pa. 326, 156 Atl. io6 (1931).
6 Durning v. Hyman, supra note i.
7For a good discussion of this view see the recent case of Ruerat v. Stevens, 155 AtI.
219 (Conn. I931).
' See Lilienthal and Rosenbaum, Motor Regulations by Certificates of Convenience and
Necessity (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 163, 164.
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not to operate unless and until they had obtained from the public utilities commis-
sions certificates to the effect that the "public convenience and necessity" required
such operation.2  Whether or not there is such a necessity presents a pure ques-
tion of fact, and although most statutes provide for a judicial review of the deci-
sions of commissions,3 the courts are, for the most part, chary of disturbing the
findings. The courts emphatically declare that they will not reverse an order
where there is sufficient evidence to support the finding, unless the commission
did not have jurisdiction,4 or had acted arbitrarily,5 or otherwise had infringed
upon the constitutional rights of the parties involved.6 A few courts, including
that of the state of the instant case, have occasionally inquired into the weight of
the evidence. 7 In the immediate case, however, none of these questions arose.
Therefore, the branding of the order of the commission as "unreasonable and
unlawful" can mean little more than that the court is substituting its own judg-
ment for that of the commission,8 a stand that is seriously to be questioned, in
view of the great weight of the authority opposed thereto.9 " Reversals should
be made only when the commission has done one or more of the things universally
accepted as unlawful, and the words "unreasonable and unlawful" should not be
used as blanket terms to describe any finding with which the court disagrees.' 0
I For a list of the states and the statutes see Hall, Certificates of Convenience and Neces-
Suly (1929) 28 Micir. L. REv. 107, 121, n. 78.
'For a list of the statutes see Lilienthal, supra note I, at 191 n. 1o8.
IRed Star Motor Drivers Association v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission, 235
Mich. 85, 2o9 N. W. 146 (1926).
r State Public Utilities Commission v. Bartonville Bus Line, 290 Ill. 574, 125 N. E. 373
(1919).
"Shearer v. Public Service Commission, 99 Pa. Super. 386 (1930); Application of
Waterloo, C. F. & N. R. Co., 206 Iowa 238, 220 N. W. 31o (1928) ; Northern Pacific R. Co.
v. Department of Public Works, I44 Wash. 47, 256 Pac. 333 (1927).
'Chicago Motor Bus Co. v. Chicago Stage Co., 287 Ill 320, 122 N. E. 477 (1919);
Lykins v. Public Utilities Commission, 115 Ohio St. 376, 154 N. E. 249 (1926).
' Thecourt apparently was greatly influenced by the fact that the appellant was a rail-
road, that it operated intrastate, and that its revenues were being diminished by bus competi-
tion. Despite these considerations, however, the question, as the chief justice pointed out in
his dissenting opinion, still remained eminently one of fact, and one that the commission with
its superior knowledge of the parties and better facilities for investigation, was more com-
petent to decide. Furthermore, the court considered only the effect of the decision on the
railroad, and not on the bus company, which also was a going public utility, and deserving of
protection. Notwithstanding a policy of protecting railroads because of their investments,
Egyptian Transp. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 321 Il1. 58o, 152 N. E. 5io (1926), this pro-
tection is not an absolute one. Rather it is the ultimate benefit to the public under all circum-
stances that is to be considered. For a discussion of the problem, see Note (1926) 24 MICnr.
L. REv. 393, 395; Lilienthal, supra note I, at 187, n. 95; Hall, supra note 2, at 287.
"The court has no power to substitute its own judgment of what is reasonable in place
of the determination of the public service commission, and it can only annul the order of the
commission for the violation of some rule of law. . . . It was not intended [by the Legis-
lature] that the courts should interfere with the commissions or review their determinations
further than is necessary to keep them within the law and protect the constitutional rights of
the corporations over which they were given control." People v. McCall, 219 N. Y. 84, 87,
113 N. E. 795, 796 (1916). See cases cited, supra notes 6 and 7, and Egyptian Transp. Co. v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., supra note 8. See also DicUNsoN, ADIMIlSImATIVE JUSTICE AND
THE SUPREMACY OF THE LAW (1927) c. VI, in which after ai discussion of the Federal Su-
preme Court Cases reviewing administrative action in the field of public utility regulation, the
author vigorously criticizes any such tendency on the part of the Supreme Court.
" See Albertsworth, Judicial Review of the Administrative Action by the Federal Su-
preme Court (1921) 35 HARv. L. REv. 127, in which at page 151, he ventures the prediction
that in cases of administrative action, the future policy of the Supreme Court will be to per-
mit judicial review on two grounds only: (I) Where there has been an improper procedure,
violating those principles of fairness and justice which satisfy the minimum of due process
of law; (2) Where the administrative official has acted beyond his jurisdiction.
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PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS-NEwSPAPERS AS AFFECTED WITH A PUB-
LIC INTERET-A newspaper company refused to insert an advertisement for a
corporation unless the latter paid a prior debt of a bankrupt firm which it had
taken over. The demand was met and when the corporation went into bank-
ruptcy, the newspaper company filed a claim for the price of the inserted adver-
tisement. A set off, for the amount of the prior debt, was attempted on the
ground that a newspaper is a business affected with a public interest and there-
fore obligated not to discriminate in its relations with its customers. Held, that
a newspaper is not a business affected with a public interest. In re Louis Woli,
Inc. 5o F. (2d) 254 (E. D. Mich. 1931).
Statutory power to regulate prices, has been consistently held by the United
States Supreme Court to extend only to a business "affected with a public inter-
est".1  In the beginning there was a liberal application of the doctrine, 2 but a
reaction set in, and a series of cases s found the Supreme Court gradually limiting
and narrowing the scope of the "public interest" rule.4 Although the present case
did not involve statutory price regulation, it was treated as though the issue
were the same, and consequently the same considerations applied as in the pre-
ceding "public interest" cases. 5 The decision, however, was not only consistent
with the latest trend in the Supr-me Court but was in accord with the holdings
of state tribunals in analogous newspaper cases. It has been held that a news-
paper" is not required to publish advertisements, 7 notices," delinquent tax lists,9
diate case, limited to the particular situation, is unquestionably sound, it does
little to clarify a confused state of law.' A survey of past decisions, and com-
ment thereon, shows no definite or clear procedure utilized in determining when
or when not a business is clothed with a sufficient "public interest" to justify
regulation.1 1 It is submitted, that a court should first ascertain what interest
'When a case involves the taking of property by the state, or the regulation of working
hours, it is considered by the courts under the police power. But when price regulation is in-
volved there is a further qualification-the business must be "affected with a public interest".
This distinction is discussed and criticized by McClain, The Convenience of the Public Inter-
est Concept, (931) 15 MINN. L. Rnv. 546, where the author comes to the conclusion that the
qualification upon price regulation is without any sound basis.
I In succession grain warehouses, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) ; and insurance
companies, German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612 (1913),
were held to be affected with a "public interest".
'Meat packers, Wolff Packing Co. v. Kansas, 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630
(1922); theatres, Tyson v. Banton, 272 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927) ; emplO Vnent
agencies, Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928) ; gasolene distributors,
William v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct 115 (1929).
"McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, (1930) 43 HARV.
L. REV. 759, 770.
'The court was undoubtedly correct in so treating the case. Under the Supreme Court
test, the legislature can only regulate the prices of a business, if that enterprise was "affected
with a public interest" at common law. Moreover, high prices and refusing to sell advertising
space to certain customers are but two manifestations of the same thing, namely, discrimina-
tion. Support for this view can be found in McClain, .yupra note I, 546 n. 3.
' In a somewhat analogous case the Associated Press was not required to sell news
without discrimination. State v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410, 6o S. W. 91 (19oi). Contra:
Inter Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56 N. E. 822 (igoo).7 Friedenberger v. Times Publishing Co., 17o La. 3, 125 So. 345 (1930). Contra: Uhl-.
man v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 225 (1920).
"Mack v. Costello, 32 S. D. 511, 143 N. W. 95o (1913) ; Comm. v. Boston Transcript
Co., 249 Mass. 477, 144 N. E. 400 (924).
'See County of Lake v. Lake County Publishing Co., 280 Ill. 243, 117 N. E. 452 (1917);
also Wooster v. Mahaska County, 122 Iowa 300, 98 N. W. 103 (1904).
or to serve carriers, 0 without discrimination. Although the result in the imme-
"Journal of Commercial Publishing Co. v. Tribune Co., 286 Fed. iii (C. C. A. Ill.
i922).
11 McClain, supra note I, 559.
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of the community, if any, is being invaded by the conduct of the business in
question; secondly, determine whether the law ought to protect such interest;
and thirdly, whether price regulation or any other means is the proper method
to achieve the desired result.12
TORTS-CoNTRACTS-DAMAGES C0NTRASTED-LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL
DISCONNECTING OF ELECTRICITY-Electric company, after notice to plaintiff, dis-.
connected the current in his home because of non-payment of a bill for power
supplied to plaintiff's barn under a separate contract. That night, a few hours
after discovering the situation, the plaintiff, while using the stairs, fell sustaining
injuries. Held (two judges dissenting), that the damages were too remote to
permit recovery. Hunphries v. Pictou County Power Board [1931] 2 D. L. R.
57'.
Following a well settled line of cases, the authorities agree that the duty
of a public utility to supply service to one house continues, though an independent
bill remains unpaid.1  A violation of a duty by a public utility subjects it to an
action for breach of contract and also to an action in tort.2 The query arises
whether the amount of damages recoverable in an action e.x delicto will differ
from those recoverable in an action ex contractu. In contract, recovery is
allowed for such damages as the parties reasonably contemplate as likely to result
from a breach.8 The scope of "contemplated damages" is usually narrow and
in most instances limited to immediate pecuniary losses. In tort the liability
for breach of duty extends to all damages both personal and pecuniary which
flow in an unbroken chain of natural cause and effect.' So in the principal case,
though the court decided that the contract action must fail because the injury was
not within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of making the
i
'In any given case, it may be difficult to ascertain just what interest is involved, or to
determine whether it deserves protection. The principal case, however, lends itself to clear
analysis. The only interest the community can have, in any individual merchant advertis-
ing without being discriminated against, is the interest in obtaining knowledge which is essen-
tial to the wise expenditure of money. Generally speaking, the law has not seen fit to protect
such interests as yet. Moreover, granting that such interest deserves protection, the means
is obviously not price regulation, since a newspaper may refuse to accept advertisements
altogether. For an application of this analysis, see the recent case of Southwest Utility Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, .52 F. (2d) 349 (C. C. A. ioth, ig3i).
IHatch v. Consumers Co., 17 Idaho 2o4, lO4 Pac. 67o (igo) ; Miller v. Roswell Gas &
Electric Co., 22 N. M. 594, i66 Pac. 1177 (1917); see Turner v. Revere Water Co., 171
Mass. 329, 336, 5o N. E. 634, 636 (1898).
'Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Potts, 12o Tenn. 37, 113 S. W. 789 (19o7). Compare
the holding that a landlord is not liable in tort for negligent .failure to repair premises, though
he had contracted to so do. Kushes v. Ginsberg, 99 N. Y. App. Div. 417, 91 N. Y. Supp. 216
(1904). But there exists a distinguishing feature in that if the landlord breaches his obliga-
tion, the performance can be rendered by another, but this is practicably impossible where
a public utility, operating a monopolistic enterprise, fails or refuses to perform its duty.
'The measure of damages in contracts was expressed in the leading case of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 354 (Eng. 1854) as, "such (damages) as may fairly and reasonably
be considered either as arising naturallyz-that is, according to the usual course of things-
from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have beeu in
the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of
a breach of it".
'But "to the extent that a contract is made to secure relief from a particular incon-
venience or annoyance or to confer a special enjoyment, the breach so far as it disappoints in
respect to that purpose may give a right to damages appropriate to objects of the contract".
I SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) § 92; Browning v. Fies, 4 Ala. App. 580, 58 So. 931
(1912).
'Tullgren v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 82 N. H. 268, 133 Atl. 4 (1926); In re Polemis v.
Furness Withy Co., [1921] 3 K. B. 56o; Bohlen, The Probable or the Natural Consequence
as the Test of Liability in Negligence (19O1) 49 U. OF PA. L. REV. 79, 148.
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contract,8 it might have allowed a recovery in tort (in the absence of contributory
negligence 7) because injury did follow in an orderly sequence from the defend-
ant's failure to perform its duty. It would appear, therefore, that where the non-
performance is a breach both of a contractual obligation and a tort duty that the
action in tort would be preferable. It must be kept in mind, however, that there
are instances where a contract action is advisable as where a special interest 
8 is
protected by the contract only 9 or where no negligence is present,
10 or where
as a practical matter it is difficult to prove the negligence.
TORTS-TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE-DUTY TO TRANSMIT MESSAGES-
LIABILITY FOR PREVENTION OF Am OFFERED BY OTHERs-Plaintiff, a subscriber
of the defendant telephone company, which had offered to transmit messages
in emergencies, instructed the operator to report a fire in his house and then
left his telephone. The portion of the house where the telephone was located
was not reached by the fire until an hour after this call. The operator neglected
to notify the fire department. Subsequently a neighbor attempted to secure a
connection with the fire department in order to report the same fire but was
refused. Held, that a directed verdict in favor of the defendant was correct
since an "emergency" did not exist at the time of the plaintiff's call and that the
plaintiff could derive no benefit from the defendant's breach of the contractual
obligation to the neighbor. Mentzer v. New England Telephone and Tel. Co.,
177 N. E. 549 (Mass. 193).
Ordinarily a telephone company owes a duty to place its subscribers in oral
communication with one another' by affording to each, without discrimination,
reasonable facilities for telephonic communication:' It is not under a duty to
' It is to be noted in this connection that some courts have given liability for contemplated
damages only where the contracting party definitely understood and assumed the liability at
the time of making the contract. Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U. S. 540,
23 SuP. Ct. 754 (19o3); British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship, L. PL 3 C. P. 499
(Eng. 1868).
The majority of the court felt that the accident was caused by the defendant's own neg-
ligence, but it is submitted that the dissenting judges in finding no negligence on the plain-
tiff's part, properly pointed out that the accident happened but three hours after the light was
disconnected; that a lamp had been borrowed; that the shops were closed; and that the un-
dertaking was not so dangerous that it should not have been attempted.
'It has been pointed out that the "contemplation of parties" formula of Hadley v. Bax-
endale, supra note 2 is primarily of importance in determining whether or" not the injured
interest of the plaintiff was within the protection of the contract and is not really a "measure
of damages". GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXImATE CAusE (927) 49.
For example if a public utility fails to supply steam heat according to its contract and
if the only damage suffered is the inconvenience and annoyance due to the cold, a recovery
in contract ould be allowed for these contemplated damages but whether the courts would
say this is a recoverable damage in tort is doubtful. Cf. Birmingham W. W. Co. v. Fergu-
son, 164 Ala. 494, 51 So. I5O 099)." Though the ambit of liability seems greater in tort than in contract yet the qualities of
the breaches differ in that the contractual liability is not dependent upon the existence of un-
reasonable conduct in the failure to perform; Pinkerton v. Slocomb, 126 Md. 665, 95 Atl. g65
(I915).
'Bess Tel. Co. v. Citizens Tel. Co., 315 Mo. io56, i87 S. W. 466 (1926); Jones v. Cum-
berland T. & T. Co., 14o Ky. 165, I68, 130 S. W. 994, 995 (igo) ; Home Tel. Co. v. Granby
& Neosho Tel. Co., I47 Mo. App. 216, 235, 126 S. W. 773, 778 (191o).
2Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U. S. 92, 21 Sup. Ct. 561 (igoi) ;
Pennsylvania R. R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U. S. 184, 33 Sup. Ct. 893 (1912) ;
CuRTIs, ELEcTRIcITY (1915) § 36; JONES, TELrzRAPH AND TELEPHONE (2d ed. 1916) § 251.
3 Masterson v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 299 Fed. 890, 55 App. D. C. 23 (924) ;
Gardner v. Providence Tel. Co., 23 R. I. 262, 49 Atl. 1oo4 (1901) ; JONES, op. cit. supra note
2, at 339.
RECENT CASES
give special services 4 or transmit messages 5 except in cases where it has so
offered, and in the latter event its liability is the same as that of a telegraph
company. 6  Once the duty is established the failure to give the connection or
transmit the message is usually the "proximate" cause of the loss, although author-
ities conflict on this point.' The conclusion of the court in the principal case that
no emergency 8 existed that would create a duty to transmit a message is doubtful
since a person ought not to be expected to remain at a telephone in a house admit-
tedly being consumed by fire. At least it should have been left to the jury
whether an emergency existed or not. It will further be noted that although the
court was correct in holding that the refusal to give the neighbor her connection
violated no contractual duty owed to the plaintiff 10 it overlooked any discussion
of the. tort duty to those whose person or property is in peril not to interfere
with aid being brought by others. 1 The defendant being aware of the situation
might well have been held liable on this ground. The decision is doubtful both
from this standpoint and the interpretation placed by the court on the emergency
service offered.
"Scranton v. Scranton R. Co., P. U. R. 1915 C 89o (Pa. 1915) ; Allied Assoc. v. P. R.
T., P. U. R. 1917 E 945 (Pa. 1917). See New England T. & T. Co. v. Dept. Public Utili-
ties, 262 Mass. 137, 159 N. E. 743 (1928).
Bess Tel. Co. v. Citizens Tel. Co., supra note i; Southwestern T. & T. v. Gotcher, 93
Te.m 114, 53 S. W. 686 (i8g) ; Southwestern T. & T. v. Flood, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 34o, iii
S. W. 1O64 (igo8). But where the message has already been accepted, refer to Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Jones, 69 Miss. 658, 13 So. 471 (1892).
'Cumberland T. & T. v. Atherton, 122 Ky. 154, 91 S. W. 257 (i9o6) ; Cumberland Tel-
Co. v. Brown, 1o4 Tenn. 56, 55 S. W. 155 (19oo).
The failure of the defendant to convey the message was conceded in the principal case
to be the proximate cause of the loss. It has been so held in Peterson v. Monroe Independent
Tel. Co., io6 Neb. I8I, 182 N. W. 1017 (1921); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Hodges, 146
Ark. 585, 228 S. W. 731 (1921) ; Southwestern T. & T. v. Harris, 214 S. W. 845 (Tex.
1919). Contra: Volquardsen v. Iowa Tel. Co., 148 Iowa 77, 126 N. W. 928 (igio); Lan-
ham Lumber Co. v. Lebanon L. & L. Tel. Co., 13 Ky. 718, 115 S. W. 824 (19o9); Barrett
v. New England T. & T., i8o N. H. 354, 117 Atl. 264 (1922) ; Whitehead v. Carolina T. &
T. Co., 19o N. C. 197, 129 S. E. 6o2 (1925) ; (1926) 12 VA. L. REG. (x. s.) 47.
'City of Marion v. Haynes, 157 Ky. 687, 698, 164 S. W. 79, 84 (1914) ; Sheehan v. City
of N. Y., 37 Misc. 432, 433, 75 N. Y. Supp. 8o2, 8o3 (1902).
'Ginley v. Louisville & N. R. Co., ioo Tenn. 472, 45 S. W. 348 (1897); Central Ky.
Traction Co. v. Miller, I47 Ky. 1o, 143 S. W. 750 (I912) ; City of Marion v. Haynes, supra
note 8.
"Standard Iron Works v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 256 Fed. 548 (W. D. S. C. 1917);
Knesek v. Crown Point Tel. Co., 82 Ind. App. 6o3, 147 N. E. 291 (1925). Some telegraph
cases have held that the company was liable to the sendees on the theory of third party bene-
ficiaries-Western Union Tel. Co. v. Morrison, 33 S. W. 1025 (Tex. 1896); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Adams, 75 Tex. 531, 12 S. W. 857 (1889), or by statutes-Western Union v.
Reynolds Bros., 77 Va. 173, 46 Am. Rep. 715 (1883) ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. McKibben,
114 Ind. 511, 14 N. E. 894 (1887). But it is suggested that even ini a jurisdiction which would
allow a recovery by a third party beneficiary would allow no recovery in the principal case
because there was no intention to contract for the benefit of the plaintiff on the part of the
neighbor. It will be noticed, however, that recovery has been allowed by the person being
sought by telephone for failure to notify him of the call. McLeod v. Pacific Tel. Co., 52 Ore.
22, 94 Pac. 568 (19o8) ; Southwestern T. & T. Co. v. Taylor, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 79, 63 S. W.
lO76 (19Oi). Compare the interesting cases of Inman v. Home T. & T. Co., 105 Wash. 234,
177 Pac. 670 (igig) and Southwestern T. & T. Co. v. Abeles, 94 Ark. 2 4, 126 ". W. 724
(1910).
I Metallic Compression Casting Co. v. Fitchburg R. Co., iog Mass. 277, 12 Am. Rep. 689
(1872) ; Globe Malleable Iron Co. v. New York Central Ry., 227 N. Y. 58, 124N.E. iog (1919);
Hurley v. Missouri K. & T. R. Co., 170 Mo. App. 235, I56 S. W. 57 (1913) ; RESTATEMENT
oF THE LAW OF TORTS (Am. L. Inst. 1929) § 187. But there is no liability if there is no
knowledge of the situation. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R., 143
Fed. 789 (C. C. A. 3d, 19o6) ; Kirstein v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 257 Pa. iA, ioI At].
338 (1917).
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TRUSTS-INFANT TRUSTEE-INABILITY TO DISAFFIRM A CONVEYANCE-A
father paid the purchase money for land and took title in the name of his infant
son as trustee. The son conveyed the land at the direction of his father and,
upon reaching majority, attempted to disaffirm the conveyance. Held, that the
conveyance could not be avoided on the ground of infancy. Persons v. Pflum,
135 So. 878 (Fla. 1931).
A trustee is not, in his fiduciary capacity, relieved of his legal disabilities.1
Although married women,2 lunatics, 3 corporations, 4 and aliens 5 may act as trus-
tees, their acts in administering the trust are subject to the same disabilities that
would limit their personal acts: Thus a married woman under common law disa-
bilities cannot, as trustee, give a valid deed of trust property without the joinder
of her husband. 6 The Trusts Restatement lays down the same general rule in
the case of infant trustees 7 and there is authority to the effect that acts requiring
the execution of discretion by an infant trustee are voidable and may be dis-
affirmed by him on majority." On the other hand, where the act is one which
the courts would have forced the infant trustee to perform, either by removing
him and directing a substitute to perform the act, or by ordering the infant to
perform on reaching majority, the infant will not be permitted to disaffirm.
Thus where the conveyance is made at the direction of the cestui que trust,"
or is merely in execution of the trust,"- it is valid and cannot be avoided. This
principle, which was applied in the instant case, seems to be satisfactorily ex-
plained on the ground that the personal privilege of disaffirmance is not applicable
to avoid an act that required no exercise of discretion and was, in effect, man-
datory.
12
1 HILL, TRUSTEES (4th Am. Ed. 1867) 48.
2 Trust Co. v. Sedgwick, 97 U. S. 304 (1877) ; see Still v. Ruby, 35 Pa. 373, 374 (i86o) ;
TRUSTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 86.
3 Swartwout v. Burr, i Barb. 49.5 (N. Y. 1847) ; Eyrick v. Hetrick, 13 Pa. 488 (i85o) ;
TRUSTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. I93O) § 88.
4 Hossack v. Ottawa Development Ass'n, 244 Ill. 274, 91 N. E. 439 (igio); Chalmers
v. City, 29 Mo. 543 (i86o) ; TnusTs RESTATEmENT (An. L. Inst. i93o) § 9z.
"Ferguson v. Franklins, 6 Munf. 305 (Va. I819) ; TRUSTS RESTATEmENr (Am. L. Inst
1930) § 89.
6Re Harkness and Allsopp's Contract, [i896] 2 Ch. 358; Hill, op. cit. mtpra note 1, 287.
' TRUSTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. i93o) § 87.
8 Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794 (Eng. I765) ; I PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUsTEEs (7th ed.
I929) 41.9 Nordholt v. Nordholt, 87 Cal. 552, 26 Pac. 599 (I89I) ; Prouty v. Edgar, 6 Iowa 353
(x858) ; Starr v. Wright, 20 Ohio St. 97 (I87O).
10 Starr v. Wright, spra note 9.
I Nordholt v. Nordholt, supra note 9; Hiawaty v. Zeock, 253 Pa. 3H, 98 AtI. 557 (1916).
'Prouty v. Edgar; Starr v. Wright, both supra note 9; see (917) 17 COL. L. BEv.
61; I WiLLIsTON, CONTRAcTS (1920) § 228, n. 4.
